Hofstra Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 3

Article 7

2005

Seeking John Doe: The Provision and Propriety of
DNA-Based Warrants in the Wake of Wisconsin v.
Dabney
Corey E. Delaney

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Delaney, Corey E. (2005) "Seeking John Doe: The Provision and Propriety of DNA-Based Warrants in the Wake of Wisconsin v.
Dabney," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 33: Iss. 3, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss3/7

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Delaney: Seeking John Doe: The Provision and Propriety of DNA-Based Warran

NOTE
SEEKING JOHN DOE: THE PROVISION AND
PROPRIETY OF DNA-BASED WARRANTS IN THE
WAKE OF WISCONSIN V DABNEY
INTRODUCTION

When they learned that David A. Shuey was charged with
attempting to rape a 33-year-old woman in St. John's County, Florida in
August, authorities in the area surrounding his alma mater, Penn State,
began examining unsolved rape cases.1 What they found was a serial
rapist. Shuey's DNA matched a sample collected from a victim who, in
May 1997, had placed an advertisement in the paper to sublet her
apartment and was raped at gunpoint by a male respondent.2 The same
thing happened just six months later to another woman seeking to sublet
her apartment only a few blocks away.3 When authorities alerted the
police in Shuey's residence of Hamden, Connecticut, it was found that
he was also wanted there for two attacks in early 2003, having
committed sexual assault, armed robbery, and kidnapping.4 However,
despite the severe nature of the crimes and their unnerving frequency,
the charges may not withstand judicial scrutiny. In order to prevent the
five year statute of limitations from running on the rapes, two "John
Doe" warrants based on the DNA collected were issued on the eve of the
statute's expiration. Whether the charges of the complaint can be
transferred from the John Doe warrants to Shuey have prosecutors
worrying; it was the first time in the county that warrants were filed
listing a defendant's DNA instead of his or her name. 5

1. See Erin L. Nissley, DNA Ties Suspect to '97 Attacks, CENTRE DAILY TIMES (State
College, PA), Sept. 19, 2003, at Al, availableat 2003 WL 55672628.
2. See id; see also Dan Lewerenz, DNA Connects Fla., Conn. Suspect to State College
Rapes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 18, 2003, availableat 9/18/03 APWIRES 19:39:00.
3. See Nissley, supra note 1.
4. See Lewerenz, supranote 2.
5. See id.
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Despite the novelty of Shuey's indictment in Pennsylvania, the
bizarre situation is not so unfamiliar to authorities in other areas of the
country. Nine years ago, a babysitter in Omaha was raped.6 In August of
2003, investigators filed a John Doe warrant for the babysitter's rapist
just days before the seven year statute of limitations on rape expired,
having obtained his DNA from a strand of hair.7 Meanwhile, a John Doe
in Colorado bludgeoned three members of a family to death in their own
home; he was charged with eighteen counts, including three counts of
first degree murder, three counts of felony murder, criminal attempt to
commit murder, two counts of sexual assault, two counts of sexual
assault on a child, and burglary. 8 A John Doe warrant for homicide had
never before been issued in Colorado, while approximately ten John Doe
warrants based on DNA evidence had been issued for sexual assault. 9 In
California, the first conviction in the state based on a John Doe warrant
(and the first in the entire nation obtained upon DNA evidence deemed
improperly obtained) resulted in a maximum sixty-five-year prison term
for rape.' 0
The legal tactic was first employed in Milwaukee six years ago"
and has been utilized numerous times thereafter; district attorneys in
New York, California, Wisconsin, Utah, Illinois, Colorado, and New
Mexico have filed John Doe warrants, indicating only a DNA code to
identify the suspect.1 2 However, the technique has withstood appeals in
Wisconsin alone: Wisconsin v. Dabney13 is the first of its kind. The
Wisconsin court was the first to address the issue of "whether a
complaint and an arrest warrant, which identity the defendant/suspect as
'John Doe' with a specific DNA profile, satisfies the particularity and
reasonable certainty requirements."' 4 The court concluded that "for
6. See Karen Spencer, "John Doe" DNA Warrant is Filed: The Legal Tactic Is Aimed at
Keeping a Case Viable Until the Unknown Suspect in a 1996 Omaha Rape Case Can Be Identified,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 7, 2003, at A4.

7. See id.
8. See Sean Kelly & Marilyn Robinson, Killer is Still Nameless, but not Unknown, John Doe
Warrants Based on DNA, DENVER POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at Al.

9. See id.
10. See Associated Press, Identified Only by DNA, Man Gets 65 Years for Rape, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., June 27, 2003, at A4, availableat 2003 WL 6593144.
11. See Spencer, supra note 6.
12. See Kelly & Robinson, supra note 8.
13. State v. Dabney, 663 N.W.2d 366 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
14. Id. at 371. In 1994, a 15-year-old was abducted from a Milwaukee bus stop. The
perpetrator threatened her life and sexually assaulted her, leaving a semen sample. However, the
analysis was not performed until six years later, in 2000, due to a lack of funding. The assistant
district attorney filed a John Doe arrest warrant based on the analysis only three days before the
statute of limitations expired. About four months later, a match to the DNA sample collected from
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purposes of identifying 'a particular person' as the defendant, a DNA
profile is arguably the most discrete, exclusive means of personal
identification possible," relying on the fact that a genetic code greatly

surpasses

a name

or physical

description

for the purpose

of

identification. 15 In addition, the court found that by relying on this type
of warrant/complaint, the State is not eliminating the statute of
limitations when tolling the action by issuing the John Doe warrant
shortly before the statutory period is up. 16 By directing its inquiry to the

Wisconsin statute of limitations,1 7 and focusing its attention on the word
"commenced" therein, the court novelly concluded that the issuing of the
complaint/warrant is itself the commencement of the action and, when
completed before the statutory period lapses, it satisfies the statutory
requirements and lawfully commences the action against the accused. 18
At least ten states, including New York,' 9 will soon consider the
removal of the statute of limitations on offenses in which DNA evidence

is found at the crime scene, following the example of twenty other states
that have passed similar laws since 2000.20 Eighteen states are
considering similar action in old child abuse cases. Another twelve states

the rape was found through a computerized database. Bobby R. Dabney, who had previously been
incarcerated for a sex-crime and who had been subject to a newly enacted state law requiring DNA
samples be collected, matched the DNA in question. Although he did not contest the DNA evidence,
he appealed the arrest warrant, arguing that the statute of limitations had tolled. Id.at 369-70.
15. Id at 372.
16. See id.
17. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.74 (2003). The pertinent part of the statute reads:
(1)Except as provided in subs. (2) and (2d)... prosecution for a felony must be
commenced within 6 years ....
(2d)(a) In this subsection, "deoxyribonucleic acid profile" means an individual's
patterned chemical structure of genetic information identified by analyzing biological
material that contains the individual's deoxyribonucleic acid.
(b) If before the time limitation under sub. (1)expired, the state collected biological
material that is evidence of the identity of the person who committed a violation ...the
state identified a deoxyribonucleic acid profile from the biological material, and
comparisons of that [DNA] profile to [DNA] profiles of known person did not result in
a probable identification of the person who is the source of the biological material, the
state may commence prosecution of the person who is the source of the biological
material for violation ...within 12 months after comparison of the DNA profile
relating to the violation results in a probable identification of the person.
Id. (Emphasis added).
18. Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 373.
19. See Robert Moran, Seeking to End DNA-case Time Limits, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 11,
2003, at Al. A campaign in New York City, the John Doe Indictment Project, seeks to do DNA
testing for hundreds of unsolved sex-crimes before the end of the ten-year statute of limitations.
20. See Mark Ballard, Tossing Out the Clock: States are Repealing Some Statutes of
Limitations, NAT'L L. J., June 23-30, 2003, at 1.
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have already done So.21 On the federal level, the Domestic Security
Enhancement Act of 2003 modifies the statute of limitations on an array
of crimes through extension or elimination 22 and Title 18 of the United
States Code explicitly addresses DNA profile indictments and excepts
them from the five-year limitation regulating criminal indictments in
general.23 So, why is Wisconsin alone among the fifty states?
While the scientific and legal advances possible through the John
Doe warrant are apparent, its application has raised fears among civil
libertarians and legal defense groups who contend that use of the
warrants abridges the defendant's right to a fair trial. The principles
behind a statute of limitation still stand as the most formidable
obstructions to the John Doe warrant; most states have thus far been
unwilling to forgo the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an
expeditious trial.24 Courts have expressed a number of interests of import
for the defendant that are at the core of the Sixth Amendment's purpose:
delay may limit defendant's ability to put forth a viable defense,25 the
preservation of freedom from oppressive pre-trial incarceration, 26 and
mitigation of the "anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation., 27 Scholars have reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's sole
purpose is to guarantee basic procedural safeguards for criminal
defendants in order to assure fairness throughout the criminal process. 28

21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2005). Concerning offenses not capital, a person is not subject to
prosecution, trial, or punishment for an offense if no indictment is found or "no information is
instituted" within the five years following the offense. Id. However, DNA profile indictments are
distinguished:
(b) DNA profile indictment.
(1)In general. In any indictment for an offense under chapter 109A for which the
identity of the accused is unknown, it shall be sufficient to describe the accused as an
individual whose name is unknown, but who has a particular DNA profile.
(2) Exception. Any indictment described under paragraph (1), which is found not later
than 5 years after the offense under chapter 109A is committed, shall not be subject
to(A) the limitations period described under subsection (a) [establishing the five year
limitation).
Id.
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment stipulates in pertinent part that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." Id.
25. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
515, 532 (1972); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969).
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1378 (1972).
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But does society have a countervailing interest in justice that outweighs
the defendant's interest in a speedy trial, so much so that it justifies
compromising a constitutional right?
Prosecutors are requesting that their state legislators pass provisions
excepting John Doe warrants issued upon DNA evidence from existing
statutes of limitation; 29 and legislators are responding. However, drafting
a statute that enables prosecutors to capitalize on the scientific advances
in the field of genetics while maintaining the defendant's legal rights is
proving to be a cumbersome project. What this Note seeks to investigate
is the precarious balance courts and legislators across the country are
being asked to establish: Must John Doe warrants that are based upon
DNA evidence collected from the crime scene succumb to the
foundational principles behind traditional statutes of limitation, and is it
constitutionally possible for the warrant to co-exist with the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial?
In Section I, this Note will explore forensic DNA and its
fundamental role in the issuance of a John Doe warrant. Section II will
enumerate the principles behind statutes of limitation and the protections
they provide. Consequently, this Note will address the paramount issue
of whether the advancement of genetic technology and the resulting
reliability of DNA-based identification have made the statute of
limitations obsolete in circumstances involving DNA, and whether such
exceptions should apply exclusively to sexual assault cases. In Section
III, the Note will examine the recent case of Wisconsin v. Dabney30 and
the indelible impact it will have on subsequent cases propagating the
issuance of DNA-based or John Doe warrants and the probability of their
success in a court of appeals. 31 Particular attention will be paid to
whether the result of Dabney would be upheld in the Supreme Court. In
conclusion, the Note will discuss why Dabney is still unique amidst the
recent attempts at amending statutes of limitation in sexual assault cases
and the growing popularity of the John Doe DNA-based warrant. Is it
particularly necessary to amend the state legislation, or can the warrant
29. See Moran, supra note 19.
30. 663 N.W.2d 366 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
31. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has since been asked to decide upon this issue. In March
of 2005, the court revisited Dabney when a defendant tried to distinguish his case by differentiating
the DNA identification methods used on the warrant and his personal identification. While the
defendant admitted that Dabney allowed for the use of a DNA-based warrant, he argued that
"because the original complaint identified the DNA profile using a different technology than the
amended complaint which eventually led to his identification, this case is distinguishable from
Dabney." State v. Davis, No. 04-1163-CR (Wis. Ct. App. 2005), available at 2005 WL 524900. The
court disagreed with the defendant, finding that his argument upheld form over substance. See id.
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withstand the scrutiny of the courts and defeat the alleged constitutional
infringements, and if not, how can legislation be drafted so as to provide
the protections granted under our Constitution while still pursuing the
best interests of justice?
I. FORENSIC DNA
DNA identification in criminal investigation has been hailed as the
"most significant advance in forensic science since the advent of
fingerprinting in the early 1900s,,,32 and furthermore as "the fingerprint

of the 21 st century. 33 Notably, it has been recognized in court that "a
DNA profile is arguably the most discrete, exclusive means of personal
identification possible." 34 From the DNA profile's inception, it has most
often been issued against perpetrators of sexual crimes, especially rape.35
The purpose of this section is to familiarize the reader with the
increasingly popular process of DNA identification in the legal
discipline and its application in issuing the John Doe warrant.
A.

The DNA Fingerprint

DNA is the chemical deoxyribonucleic acid found in all nucleated
cells and is the genetic blueprint for every life form. Scientists construct
a "DNA fingerprint" using the variations of each individual's DNA
code: it can be determined whether two samples of DNA come from the
same person by comparing isolated sections of these codes. The DNA
strand is a sequence of millions of nucleotides, which are composed of
sugar, a phosphate group, and one of four bases: (A) adenine, (G)

32. Mark Hansen, The GreatDetective, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 37-38.
33. Daniel LeDuc, Md.Bill Would Expand DNA Database; Supporters Want Sample from
Anyone Convicted of a Felony, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2002, at BI (quoting Del. Ann Marie Doory
(D-Baltimore), sponsor of a Maryland proposal that would expand, to the inclusion of those arrested
for violent felonies, the DNA database).
34. Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 372.
35. See Paul E. Tracy, Ph.D. & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA
Databases for 21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 657 (2000)
(noting that DNA evidence is usually limited to cases of murder and rape); Julian E. Barnes, East
Side Rapist, Known Solely by DNA, Is Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at B 1 (discussing the
indictment of an unknown rapist in Manhattan issued upon DNA evidence and predicting that such
actions will soon be repeated throughout the country); Unknown Man Indicted in Austin Rape Case,
Hous. CHRON., Nov. 5, 2000, at 45 (noting that a grand jury indicted an unknown man for a 1995
rape case when genetic material constituted the only evidence); Richard Willing, Police Expand
DNA Use, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 2000, at IA (noting that California is one of at least six states that
has filed charges against unidentified suspects using DNA evidence). See also supra notes 1-10 and
the accompanying text.
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36
guanine, (T) thymine, and (C) cytosine. The bases interact with each
other and form the DNA helix. 37 Most importantly, the sequence of the
bases determines the protein and enzyme make-up of our cells. Human
beings share long stretches of similar DNA, throughout which there are
small areas of marked variations in the base sequence. 38 These regions,
called "polymorphisms," repeat themselves and are used to differentiate
between individuals; "the chances of any two individuals, except
identical twins, having the same polymorphisms in [specific] segments
of the DNA molecule [is] quite remote., 39 In 1985, Alec Jeffreys
discovered the application of DNA technology to the science of personal
identification while searching for disease markers in DNA.4 ° Jeffreys
was the originator of the term "DNA fingerprinting" and the restriction
fragment length polymorphism ("RFLP") test, which identifies and
isolates these polymorphisms for use in identification.4a RFLP is a
process by which the DNA sequence is cut with enzymes designed to
identify certain base sequences. The enzymes will cut the DNA strand
into particular base sequences which will then be used for identification
and comparison.42 The RFLP test was replaced shortly after its inception
with the polymerase chain reaction ("PCR") developed by Kerry
Mullis, 4 3 which remains the standard procedure today. The PCR is a
method by which DNA is extracted and replicated through a process
similar to the natural process of our cells, resulting in a million fold
replication of the DNA chain.4 4 PCR will allow a short stretch of DNA
to be amplified exponentially so that one can determine its size,
nucleotide sequence, etc. 45 The particular stretch of DNA to be
amplified, called the target sequence, is identified by a specific pair of
DNA primers, oligonucleotides, which are usually about twenty
nucleotides in length.4 6 With the PCR's amplification potential, there is

36. See VERNON J. GERBERTH, PRACTICAL HOMICIDE
PROCEDURES, AND FORENSIC TECHNIQUES 542 (3d ed. 1996).

INVESTIGATION:

TACTICS,

37. See id
38. See id at 546.
39. Id. at 546-47. The probability of two people sharing the same DNA profile is
approximately one in thirty billion. See Amy Dunn, Note, Statutes of Limitation on Sexual Assault
Crimes: Has the Availability of DNA Evidence Rendered Them Obsolete?, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK

L. REV. 839, 847 (2001).
40. GERBERTH, supra note 36, at 547.
41.

See id

42. See id. at 548-51.
at 547.
43. Mullis received the Nobel Prize in 1992 for her discovery. See id.
44. See id. at554.
The
Polymerase Chain Reaction,
Tabitha
M.
Powledge,
45. See
http://www.faseb.org/opar/bloodsupply/pcr.html (last visited May 24, 2005).
46. See id
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enough DNA in one-tenth of one-millionth of a liter (0.1 microliter) of
human saliva to use the PCR system to identify a genetic sequence.47
Prior to DNA fingerprinting, the best mode of assailant
identification available to forensic scientists was blood-type and protein
enzymes; scientists were able to exclude an individual or suggest an

inclusion by analyzing the blood samples.48 DNA fingerprinting proves
to be an improvement upon blood-typing for reasons beyond its
precision in identification: DNA maintains its integrity as a dried
specimen for extended periods of time, and may therefore be used years,
even decades, 49 after it was collected, either to open an old case or to
link an old case to a recent case or suspect. 50 Furthermore, since DNA is
found in all nucleated cells, a sample for extraction from the crime scene
can be a hair, skin, blood, urine, sperm, saliva, 5 1 and may even come
from swabs taken from objects touched by the perpetrator.52
Once a DNA sample has been collected, it is compared to samples
within the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"), created by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1990. 53 Spurred by the passage of the
DNA Identification Act of 1994, the progressive movement to maintain
the national offender DNA database administered by the FBI and to offer
financial incentives for states to create their own offender DNA
databases actualized nationwide recognition.54 Today, all fifty states
have legislation requiring specific classes of convicted offenders to
provide DNA fingerprints for inclusion in both their state database and
the FBI's CODIS. 5 5 As of October 1998, CODIS contained over 250,000
47. See John C. Brown, What the Heck is PCR?, at http://People.Ku.edu/-jbrown/PCR.Html
(1995).
48. See id at 557.
49. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE, WHAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DNA EVIDENCE 2
(1999), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/000614.htm.
50. See GERBERTH, supra note 36, at 561.
51. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 35, at 639; see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 49.
52. Lindsy A. Elkins, Note, Five Foot Two With Eyes of Blue: Physical Profiling and the
Prospect of a Genetics-BasedCriminalJustice System, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
269, 277 (2003).
53. Andrew C. Bemasconi, Comment, Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA Threatens
CriminalDefendants' Constitutionaland Statutory Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 979, 986 (200 1).
54. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796kk-3796kk-6, 14131-34 (1994) and codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3751, 3753, 3793, 3797 (2005).
55. Justice for Sexual Assault Victims: Using DNA Evidence to Combat Crime: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong., 13-14 (2002) [hereinafter Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs] (statement of Sarah V. Hart,
Director, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice). Whether a sample is collected
from a particular offender depends upon state legislation. It is the state that determines which crimes
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DNA fingerprints and was responsible for over 400 matches between
known offender DNA fingerprints and DNA left at crime scenes.56 The
CODIS system is constructed of four databases:
(1) convicted offenders, whose samples are taken upon
conviction, incarceration, or release; (2) unsolved cases, which
contains biological crime scene evidence; (3) missing persons
data base, which contains both unidentified remains and profiles
of parents of missing children; and (4) populations data base,
which compiles the frequency of certain genetic markers among
various populations.57
Despite the database's exponential growth, or perhaps as a result of
it, the national system has encountered a number of difficult problems.
First, the current national database is approaching full capacity, having
been filled with DNA samples of convicted offenders.58 The system
simply is not large enough to accommodate the rapidly increasing
number of mandated samples. Second, there is an astronomical backlog

warrant the sample. Initially, state statutes only required DNA fingerprints for inclusion in the
database from offenders convicted of a small class of crimes such as homicide and sexual assault.
As technology now allows for extraction of DNA from smaller, more common, bits of evidence
such as hair and skin cells, the list of enumerated offenses that states are willing to include in their
databases is expanding. See Amy Argetsinger & Craig Whitlock, Md. Seeks the DNA of Violent
Criminals; Critics Cite Threat to Privacy Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1999, at B 1. New York
requires all individuals convicted of a felony to provide a sample "appropriate for DNA testing to
determine identification characteristics specific to such person and to be included in a state DNA
identification index." N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 995-c (McKinney 2005). Upon reversal or vacatur of the
conviction, the sample is expunged from the index. Id. Virginia enacted legislation in 2003 which
mandated the collection of DNA samples (from tissue or saliva) from arrestees of a violent felony,
and for the collection of blood, saliva, or tissue from a convicted felon. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2310.2 (2004). California requires DNA and forensic identification databank samples for the
following felony offenses: any offense that requires them to register as a sex offender, murder,
voluntary manslaughter, felony spousal abuse, aggravated sexual assault of a child, a felony offense
of assault or battery, kidnapping, mayhem, torture, burglary, robbery, arson, car jacking, and
terrorist activity (many of these also include the attempt to commit). CAL. PENAL CODE § 296
(2003). Only Colorado and Washington have laws that specifically allow for indictments issued
solely upon DNA evidence. Molly McDonough, DNA Profile Conviction Upheld,A.B.A. J. E-REP.,
May 30, 2003, availableat Westlaw, 2 NO. 21 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 3.
56. See Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal
Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 940 (1999).
57. Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope
of Law Enforcement DNA DataBanks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 131 (2001). Entry into the system is
limited to specific crime labs.
58. See Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, supra note 55, at 12 (Statement of Dwight E.
Adams, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington,
D.C.).
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of untested rape kits nationwide. 59 There is no current accurate number
of untested kits; however, press reports estimate a number approaching
500,000, and a government report from 1999 found that there were then
180,000 kits untested.6 ° In addition, there are 500,000 samples from
convicted felons that have yet to be tested. 61 Third, there is a shortage of
funds for state labs, resulting in the backlog of untested rape kits and the
failure to enter samples into the CODIS.6 2 Furthermore, the system has
encountered a number of legal challenges: issues have been raised over
the denial of good conduct time for prisoners who refuse to submit
themselves for a sample, the use of force to obtain a sample from
uncooperative prisoners, making parole contingent upon the submission
of a DNA sample, and the subsequent use of the samples in trials.6 3 The
most substantial argument is that the databank is unconstitutional as a
violation of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure. 64 However, none of these challenges have had an
impact on the constitutional analysis of the courts.65
B.

The John Doe Warrant

John Doe or DNA profile-based warrants "provide no name, as
would normally accompany the charges, instead listing a series of letters
and numbers designating certain measurements of DNA segments that,
taken together, represent the rapist's unique DNA profile. 66 It is
believed that the first John Doe warrant was filed in Kansas in 1991 ;67
however, it was with the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin's decision in
Dabney, which was decided in 1999, that the controversial practice was

59. See id.at 15 (Statement of Sarah V. Hart, Director, National Institute of Justice, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.). A rape kit is the collection of semen samples from the rape
victim, done by either hospital staff or the police during a victim's post-rape hospital examination.
The specimen is then retained by the police as evidence of the crime.
60. See id.at 3 (Opening statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator from the State
of Delaware).
61. See id. In the fiscal year 2002, approximately $80 million was funded by Congress to the
states for DNA and other forensic support. See id.at 14. (Statement of Sarah V. Hart).
62. See id. at 3.
63. See Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 57, at 132.
64. See id at 133. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. See Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 57, at 133.
66. Elkins, supra note 52, at 279. (quoting Michael Luo, Unnamed Man Indicted by DNA,
NEWSDAY (Long Island, NY), Aug. 9, 2000, at A3).
67. Id. at 279 fn. 78.
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recognized and adopted by other jurisdictions. 68 As of 2003, there were
approximately twenty such John Doe warrants issued throughout the
country; 69 today, the Manhattan District Attorney's office, alone, has
obtained thirty-one.7 °
However, there is much controversy over the sufficiency of the
information provided to identify the perpetrator on the John Doe
warrant. The standard for warrants and indictments in most jurisdictions
is "any name or description by which [the perpetrator] can be identified
When Detective Lori Gaglione filed the
with reasonable certainty.'
original complaint in the Dabney case, the plaintiff was listed as:
John Doe #12, Unknown Male with Matching Deoxyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) Profile as Genetic Locations D3S 1358, vWA, FGA, D8S 1179,
D5S818, D13S317, D7S820, D16S539, THO1,
D21S11, D18S51,
72
TPOX, CSF 1PO

It was on this complaint that authorities issued the warrant,
including only the above information, and with no other specification of
identity than the perpetrator's sex and race. 73 However, it was because of
this cryptic moniker that Bobby R. Dabney was identified as the
kidnapper and assailant through a "cold hit" 74 in the databank. 75 The
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Julia Preston, ProsecutorSeeks Unlimited Time in Rape Cases, N.Y. TIMES, April 29,
2005, at BI (noting that the office had only started to obtain such warrants in 2000).
71. Frank B. Ulmer, Note, Using DNA Profiles to Obtain "JohnDoe" Arrest Warrants and
Indictments, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1585, 1608 (2001). The Fourth Amendment requires that
warrants "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. See State of Wisconsin, Circuit Court Criminal Division, Milwaukee County, Criminal
at
http://www.denverda.org/
available
#
00XF892 1,
DA
Case
Complaint,
(last visited May 24, 2005) (the
legalresource/JohnDoeComplaintWithGeneticProfile.PDF
identification of the defendant is then followed by a listing of the five counts charged, the respective
penalties, and a detailed account of the kidnapping and sexual assault).
73. However, the perpetrator's race was specified as "U" -Unknown. See State of Wisconsin,
Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, Felony Warrant (and Authorization for Extradition), DA Case #
(last
00XF8921 available at http://www.denverda.org/legalresource/JohnDoeArrestWarrant.PDF
visited May 24, 2005). The Sensitive Crimes Division of the Milwaukee Police Department began
issuing John Doe warrants in September of 1999 to preserve jurisdiction over individuals it
otherwise would not have because of the statutes of limitation on the crimes. The Department had
become frustrated with the recurring situation where it was able to identify an offender, but do
nothing about it because of the passing of the time limit. See Press Release, Norm Gahn, Milwaukee
County District Attorney's Office, The Wisconsin John Doe Warrant, available at
http://www.denverda.org/legalResouce/Gahn% 20Article.PDF.
74. Rodney Bowers, DNA Links Suspect to Benton Burglary, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE,
Apr. 8, 2000, at BI (describing a "cold hit" as the result of "matching a DNA sample to a previously
unknown suspect").
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amended complaint, after the cold hit, was identical to the original in all
ways but one: where before there had been a DNA profile for an
unknown male, there was now a name.7 6 Dabney's defense was
predicated upon the argument that the original complaint and arrest
warrant that identified him solely by his DNA profile were insufficient
and therefore could not pass the "reasonable certainty" requirement of
Wisconsin Statute section 968.04(3)(a)4.7 7 Further, because the original
complaint was insufficient and the warrant was not issued in a timely
manner, the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations.
The increasing frequency of the issuance of the John Doe warrants
has resulted in a cry in many jurisdictions for an exception to the statute
of limitations, since the warrant allows for the "identification of the
perpetrator after the expiration of the normal period of limitations. 7 9
Proponents of this request argue that the "legislative purpose of the
statute is to prevent the maintenance of prosecutions based on stale,
unreliable evidence but that DNA evidence is so reliable that its
availability should lift the bar of the statute." 80 However, Dabney's
argument is that echoed by defendants and supporting rights groups
across the country: the statutes of limitation were created as a protection
for the defendants, and are an undeniable right. What must be considered
are the founding principles of the statutes of limitation, and in light of
current forensic technology, the current applicability of the statutes of
limitation. Have they outlived their purpose?

75.

See Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 369-70.

76. See State of Wisconsin, Circuit Court Criminal Division, Milwaukee County, Amended
Criminal Complaint, DA Case # 00XF8921 available at http://www.denverda.org/legalResource/

AmendedComplaintAfterColdHit.PDF (last visited May 24, 2005).
77. WIS. STAT. § 968.04(3)(a)4 (2004) (providing that the arrest warrant shall: "State the
name of the person to be arrested, if known, or if not known, designate the person to be arrested by
any description by which the person to be arrested can be identified with reasonable certainty").
78. See Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 370.
79. Elkins, supra note 52, at 279.
80. Id. (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Robert Moran, Seeking to End DNA-case Time Limits;
Phila. 's District Attorney Wants Pa. to Lift Statutes of Limitations on Many Crimes In Which
Genetic Evidence Identifies Criminals, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 11, 2003, at A01; Richard Pyle,
Pataki Lobbies for Expanded DNA Bill, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), June 5, 2003, at B 11.

Governor Pataki proposed to the state Assembly a plan to "expand the state's current law on DNA
by eliminating the five-year statute of limitations on violent felonies, require everyone convicted of
a felony or major misdemeanor to furnish a DNA sample and create a DNA databank for all missing
persons that would be linked to the FBI's national databank." Id.
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II.

STATUTES OF LIMITATION

With the increasing enthusiasm for the DNA-based John Doe
warrant, there is a growing concern: by charging a DNA sequence rather
than a denominated individual with a crime, are we adversely affecting
the defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial? Do the historical and
political foundations of the statute of limitations efface DNA-based John
Doe warrants of any validity and legitimacy? To answer such questions,
we must look to the foundations of the contemporary statutes of
limitation.
A.

History of Statutes ofLimitation

Statutes of limitation originate from early English laws governing
civil property claims, the invocation of which became so popular at the
beginning of the seventeenth century that King James I responded by
codifying a new statute to allow the augmentation of the use of statutes
of limitation to legal claims in general. 8' The prevalent use of the statutes
survived the pilgrimage from England to the American colonies,
although even there the statutes were applied only to civil cases.8 2 It was
not until after the American Revolution that criminal application of the
statutes became widespread as states began effectuating time limits for
criminal prosecution.83 Today, all but seven states have statutes of
limitation for felonies. 84 The respective state legislatures construct these
statutes and maintain authority over their application and adherence,
resulting in a variation of time limitations for respective crimes from
state to state. 85 However, there remain uniform qualities among the
diverse statutes. First, the pertinent state legislative body has the
authority to modify all time limiting actions. Second, all modifications to
the limitation periods must be definitively established by the state.

81. See William M. Schrier, Note, The Guardianor the Ward. For Whom Does the Statute
Toll?, 71 B.U.L. REV. 575, 576 (1991); Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv.
L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1950).
82. See generally WILLIAM D. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS SAVING STATUTES

7-47 (1978).
83. See Developments in the Law, supra note 81, at 1179.
84. See Bernasconi, supra note 53, at fn. 83. Those seven states that do not have statutes of
limitation for felonies are Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia,
and West Virginia. See ALA.CODE § 15-3-5(a)(4) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.050 (Michie
1990); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-106 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-1 (2004); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 12-21-2 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Michie 2004); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-9
(2005).
85. See Bemasconi, supra note 53, at 993.
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exists limited court discretion in applying these

B. Policies SupportingStatutes ofLimitation
There are a number of rationales recognized as justifying statutes of
limitation. The first and perhaps most notable rationale is the object of
promoting repose. Repose promises benefits for all the parties involved
in a particular crime: the defendant will not be asked to defend against
acts committed in the distant past,87 the innocent and unsure will be free
from erroneous prosecution,88 the witnesses and victims will be provided
the peace of mind that the ordeal has reached an end and is past, 89 and
the police are free to conclude investigation of the old case and redirect
their attention to more recent affairs. 90 The sum of these advantages is
the provision of "security and stability to human affairs." 9' Statutes are
most often construed liberally in favor of repose because courts are
mindful of the potential prejudice that may be created against the
defendant who has to battle charges based on archaic acts,92 and
therefore generally hold the statutes "favored in the law. 93
The statute of limitation is not the only protection available for the
defendant seeking repose. That is, a constitutionally based due process
argument also guarantees that a defendant will not have to contend with
stale charges. 94 The similarity between the two defenses is conspicuous
as noted in Doggett v. United States:95
Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that

the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold
dividing ordinary from "presumptively prejudicial" delay, since, by
definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a
"speedy" trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary
promptness. If the accused makes this showing, the court must then
consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay
stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial
86. See id.
87. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues,
76 WASH. L. REv. 413,472 (2001).
88. See Dunn, supra note 39, at 846.
89. See id.
90. See id
91. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
92. See Bernasconi, supranote 53, at 997-98.
93. Wood, 101 U.S. at 139.

94. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 notes of decision.
95. 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
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examination of the claim. This latter enquiry is significant to the
that pretrial delay has
speedy trial analysis because... the presumption
96
prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.
Facially, the Sixth Amendment precludes the delay of a trial for the
accused under any and all conditions. However, the Court curtails the
application of the Amendment by
specifically recognizing the relevance of four separate enquiries:
whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay,
a speedy
whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to
97
trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result.
A second policy argument is the importance of affording the
defendant protection against the possible disadvantages accompanying
the defense against stale claims. 98 Embodied within the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant's right to a fair trial is comprised of the right to
assemble evidence and prepare a vigorous defense, the exercise of which
becomes increasingly difficult as time passes. 99 Evidence inherently
degenerates with time as memories fade and witnesses become
unavailable. In Toussie v. United States, the Supreme Court noted:
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal
prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence
of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal
sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from
having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may
100
have become obscured by the passage of time ....

96. Id. at 651-52 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 651.
98. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966).
99. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

100. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970).
The statute in this case provides that all young men, with certain exceptions, between the
ages of 18 and 26 shall register 'at such time or times and place or places' as the
President may prescribe. The Government [referred] to a regulation promulgated under
the Act which [provided] that '(t)he duty of every person subject to registration shall
continue at all times, and if for any reason any such person is not registered on the day or
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Such deterioration of evidence inevitably leads to greater financial costs
for the defense: witnesses become more difficult to locate and the
reconstruction of the events surrounding the alleged crime requires
increased amounts of research and investigation. 10 1 Therefore, the
passing of time equates to both a greater evidentiary burden as well as a
financial burden for the defendant. The statute of limitations seeks to
regulate this resulting burden for a sub-class of defendants and seeks to
provide all defendants with the equal right to conceive a substantial
defense.
A further policy justification is that as time passes, society's need
for punishment diminishes. 0 2 When a crime is committed, there is a
pervasive societal desire for retribution. Scholars in this field propose
that, as these criminal acts become part of the distant past of the potential
defendant, society is less concerned with seeking retribution and is more
likely to consider the defendant "self-rehabilitated" if he has not repeated
the original criminal act. 0 3 Those defendants who continue their
criminal behavior will be punished for their more recent acts, abating the
need for punishment for past acts. 0 4 However, this policy argument is
implausible when the crime at issue is sexual assault. The inherent
violence and horrific violation of sexual assault combined with the longlasting psychological injury it causes makes it a crime not easily
forgotten or forgiven.105 Moreover, it has been established that sexual
assailants repeat their crimes more often than any other class of
offenders. 0 6 Therefore, society plainly has a perpetual interest in the
prosecution of sexual offenders, and is not placated with the passage of
time.
A final justification advanced for statutes of limitation also relates
to the protection afforded to the defendant against an unfair trial, arguing

one of the days fixed for his registration, he shall immediately present himself for and
submit to registration.'
Id. (citing C.F.R. § 1611.1(c)).
However, the court found that the regulation only made explicit what Congress implicitly said in the
Act itself, that is that "registration is a duty that continues until age 26 and failure to register before
then is a criminal offense that can be punished as late as five years after the 26th birthday." Id. at
116.
101. See Dunn, supra note 39, at 846.
102. See id. at 845.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Meredith A. Bieber, Comment, Meeting the Statute or Beating It: Using "John Doe"
Indictments Based on DNA to Meet the Statute of Limitations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1091
(2002).
106. See Dunn, supra note 39, at 863.
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that protection is provided by "encouraging law enforcement officials to
investigate and prosecute crimes in a timely manner."' 10 7 The statutes are
an assurance of diligence on the state's part, preventing any attempts to
delay the prosecution. 0 8 Most of these delays are not amoral or tactical,
but are in fact the consequence of limited personnel and financial
resources within the police departments. 10 9 However, even without any
intended malice, a delay in prosecution can result in harm to defendants
in "low priority" cases that may succumb to a system of rank, "thereby
creating more prejudice for some criminal defendants than others."''110
The statute of limitations assures that every case will be brought and
tried in a timely manner, or will not be prosecuted at all.
C. Issues Educed by the DNA Indictment
The preeminent reason DNA warrants raise concern is because they
purport to extend the statute of limitations. In light of the preceding
enumeration of justifying policies, such an extension is in direct conflict
with the defendant's interests that the statutes seek to protect. By
effectively tolling the limitation period, the indictments will contravene
the statutes' promised repose and will force the defendant to answer stale
charges, so outdated they impede his ability to gather potentially
exculpatory evidence."'
Not only will circumstantial evidence, alibis, and witnesses become
increasingly difficult to assemble with the passage of time, but the
existing evidence, the DNA sample itself, may prove inadequate for the
construction of a substantial defense. There is always the unfortunate
possibility that a law enforcement agent or lab technician may mislabel
or misplace the evidence," 12 dispossessing the defendant of his right to
also run tests on the DNA sample. Furthermore, the sample may be so
small that after the initial analyses are run by the prosecution, there will
not be enough remaining material for the defendant's own analyses.1 3 In
both of these situations, the defendant is denied the opportunity to
107. Id. at 844.
108. See id. at 845.
109. Seeid.
110.

Id.

111.

See Bernasconi, supra note 53, at 999.

112.

See COMMISSION ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA

EVIDENCE 80 (1996) (noting that mislabeling of samples can occur at any point at which evidence is
handled); Ulmer, supra note 70, at 1617-18; see also DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF OLD CRIMES 61, 88, 97 (2000) (recognizing that the

passage of time increases the likelihood of misplacing evidence).
113. See Ulmer, supranote 71, at 1618.
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confirm or rebut the prosecution's evidence, and is forced to rely upon
that same evidence that the opposition is claiming to be conclusive of
positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime.
Accepting that the DNA profile may establish the defendant's
identity beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may still make an
argument that the DNA sample was deposited at the crime scene not as a
result of the crime, but either because the defendant was merely at the
scene, or because the sex was consensual rather than rape. 1 4 In either of
these situations, the defendant's ability to assemble alibi witnesses or
witnesses to the character of the defendant's relationship with the alleged
victim has been negated with the passage of time,' 1 5 and his defense is
significantly weakened.
III.

WISCONSIN V. DABNEY

Wisconsin v. Dabney defines the limitations and capabilities of
DNA-based John Doe warrants in three capacities: it addresses the issue
of whether an indictment and warrant based upon a DNA profile is
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction to the courts,' 6 whether a
subsequently amended complaint (including the accused's name after a
cold hit has been obtained) is barred by the state's statute of
limitations, 1 7 and whether a John Doe warrant violates the accused's
Due Process rights and his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 18
An element integral to both Dabney's and the court's argument is the
timing of the case; a time line best illustrates:
December 7, 1994-15 year-old Dawana F. is kidnapped at gunpoint
and is twice forced to perform fellatio while blindfolded in the
kidnapper's car. 119 Once released, she is immediately taken to a sexual
assault treatment center where "'oral swabs and saliva samples' as well
as a 'blood standard' [are] obtained from her." 120 Semen is found in
her saliva and
is used to develop a DNA profile for the unknown male
12 1
perpetrator.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at 1618-19.
See id.
See Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 371.
See id. at 369.
Seeid. at374.
Seeid. at369.

120.
121.

Id.
Id.
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December 4, 2000-The State charges John Doe #12 with kidnapping
and four counts of first-degree sexual assault. The DNA profile is used
as the means of identification in the complaint. A trial court finds
probable cause in the complaint and issues an arrest warrant for John
Doe #12.122
December 18, 2000-The DNA
123 profile is run against the DNA
databank, but no match is found.
February 27, 2001-The DNA profile is again run against the
databank, and a match is found: the DNA profile formulated from the
sample collected matches that of Robert Dabney. 124 The match is
reconfirmed on March 7, 2001.125
March 14, 2001-The State files an amended complaint, replacing the
DNA profile and identification of "John Doe" with Dabney's name.
The previous match searches are included in the complaint.
April 12, 2001-Dabney is bound over for trial and an information is
filed, setting forth five counts: kidnapping, and four counts of first127
degree sexual assault (two hand-to-breast and two mouth-to-penis).
June 2001-Dabney moves to dismiss the charges, arguing that the
original complaint and arrest warrant were insufficient in that they
were based solely on his DNA profile and could not toll the six year
statute of limitations, which would have expired on December 7, 2000.
He further argues that the delay2 in prosecution violated his Sixth
Amendment right to Due Process.
to dismiss is denied orally, followed by a
July 2001-Dabney's motion
129
written denial in August.
September 13, 2001-The court denies Dabney's filing for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and his request for pre-trial
review.130
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id
See id.
See id.
See id. at 370.
See id. at 369.
Id. at 370.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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13 1
February6, 2002-Case is tried to the court.

After being found guilty by the trial court, Dabney set forth three
arguments on appeal. First, that the complaint and arrest warrant, which
originally identified him only by his DNA profile, were insufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction to the court. Second, Dabney argued that the
amended complaint, which identified him by his name, was untimely and
barred by Wisconsin's statute of limitations. Finally, he argued that his
Due Process rights were violated by the six year delay between the
commission of the crime and the commencement of the prosecution. An
analysis of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' answer to Dabney's
contentions reveals the obsolescence of the statute of limitations in the
prosecution of sexual crimes, and the unnecessary complications such a
statute may cause. The court systematically denied each argument and
established the DNA-based John Doe warrant as a fungible tool of
criminal prosecution, solidifying the precedent of this case.
As to the first of Dabney's arguments, the court predicated its
finding that jurisdiction was properly obtained upon the satisfaction of
two common law requirements. First, the prosecution must file a
complaint or an indictment stating probable cause to believe a crime has
32
been committed and that it was probably committed by the defendant.
In addition, the filing of the complaint or indictment must be in
compliance with the applicable statute of limitations. 133 In other words,
the action must be commenced before the cessation of the statutory
period. The Wisconsin Statute Section 939.74(1) states that an action is
"commenced when a warrant or summons is issued, an indictment is
found, or an information is filed."' 134 The complaint and arrest warrant
for Dabney were filed three days before the expiration of the applicable
six year statute of limitations. 35 While Dabney did not contest this fact,
he argued that the complaint and warrant were not sufficient because
they did not pass the reasonable certainty test set forth by the Wisconsin
36
legislature. 1
Wisconsin Statute Section 968.04(3)(a)4 states that the arrest
warrant shall "[s]tate the name of the person to be arrested, if known, or
if not known, designate the person to be arrested by any description by
which the person to be arrested can be identified with reasonable
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id.
See State v. Smith, 388 N.W.2d 601, 609 (Wis. 1986).
See State v. Pohlhammer, 254 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Wis. 1977).
WIS. STAT. § 939.74(1).
See Dabney 663 N.W.2d at 371.
See id
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certainty.' 37 The court held that the "reasonable certainty" standard is
satisfied when the name is unknown if the identification on the
complaint and warrant was "the best description available." '3 8 It
concluded that "for purposes of identifying 'a particular person' as the
defendant, a DNA profile is arguably the most discrete, exclusive means
of personal identification possible,"'1 39 further stating that a DNA profile
provides a far superior description of the defendant than a physical
description. 140 It should be noted that the court follows this conclusion
with the comment that when possible, the DNA profile should be
accompanied by any particular physical characteristics of the defendant
that are known by the police.141 However, due to the circumstances of
this particular crime, there were no known physical characteristics of the
defendant to be included in the complaint and warrant. 142 Therefore, the
complaint and warrant identified the defendant with reasonable certainty
and were filed within the statutory period, commencing the action and
conferring jurisdiction upon the court.
Would this decision be upheld if it came before the United States
Supreme Court? Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the
applicability of the DNA-based John Doe warrant, the Court has decided
other cases involving John Doe warrants and the reasonable certainty
requirement of warrants in general. The Court relies upon a strict
"constitutional requirement of a particular description in the warrant,' 43
the foundation for which is found in the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. 144 In West v. Cabell, the Supreme Court articulated
the point at which any court is to begin a consideration of whether an
arrest warrant satisfies the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement:

137.
138.

WIS. STAT. § 968.04(3)(a)4.
See Dabney, 633 N.W.2d at 371.

139. Id. at 372.
140.
141.

See id.
See id. This was added in the interest of protecting notice for the defendant, as the DNA

profile itself would be meaningless for self-identification.
142.
143.
144.

See id
West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 88 (1894).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
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By the common law, a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with
crime must truly name him, or describe him sufficiently to identify
him....
The principle of the common law, by which warrants of arrest, in
cases criminal or civil, must specifically name or describe the person to
be arrested, has been affirmed in the American constitutions; and by
that does not do
the great weight of authority in this country a warrant
145
so will not justify the officer making the arrest.
Relying upon this principle, lower courts have both upheld and
denied the application of John Doe warrants, deciding on a case-by-case
basis whether the warrant satisfies the particularity requirement. The
determination relies substantially upon the particular facts of each case.
Courts have invalidated warrants that ostensibly professed to authorize
146
searches of undescribed, unidentified persons at a particular location.
Other courts have invalidated John Doe warrants when extrinsic
evidence is relied upon to supplement the warrant in lieu of a more
thorough identification within the warrant itself. 47 However, the Third
Circuit reached the opposite result in 1971 with United States v.
Ferrone,148 where the court upheld a warrant that authorized the search
of "John Doe, a white male with black wavy hair and stocky build
observed using the telephone in Apartment 4-C, 1806 Patricia Lane, East
McKeesport, Pennsylvania." 149 The court held that the physical
description, coupled with an address where he might be found, satisfied
the specificity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, even without the
actual name of the defendant. 50
So, would a DNA-profile withstand the scrutiny of courts outside of
Wisconsin? Does it satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement? The principal reason the previously mentioned warrants
were found to fail the specificity requirement of the standard of
particularity was because they left too much room for error in identifying
the alleged defendant: A description must be the best description

145.

West, 153 U.S. at 85-86.

146.

See People v. Tenney, 101 Cal. Rptr. 419, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); see also People v.

Staes, 235 N.E.2d 882, 886 (I1. App. Ct. 1968).
147. See United States v. Doe, 703 F.2d 745, 747-48 (3d Cir. 1983); see also United States v.
Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,435 U.S. 934 (1978).
148. 438 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1971).

149. Id at 389.
150.

See id.
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available for it to be held sufficient. 151 The DNA-profile leaves less
room for mistaken identity than does a name. For example, even though
an individual can always assume an alias, or even legally change his
name, he can never change or escape his DNA code. In addition, given
the accuracy of contemporary technology, the chance of mistake in the
formulation of the DNA-profile and its correspondence to an individual
is minimal. 152 As the Dabney court stated, the DNA profile is "arguably
the most discrete, exclusive means of personal identification
possible. 153 Therefore, the DNA profile would most certainly meet the
particularity standard of the Fourth Amendment and would satisfy the
accompanying judicial scrutiny.
Dabney's second argument contended that by relying upon a DNAbased warrant, the state "is effectively eliminating the statute of
limitations because a DNA complaint/warrant could be issued just before
'1 54
the statute of limitations passed in order to toll the action forever."
The court replied with two arguments as to why the state's actions do not
effectually nullify the Wisconsin statute of limitations. First, the
"protection afforded by the statute of limitations is not a fundamental
right of a criminal defendant."' 55 The court makes clear that the
protection is statutorily created for the purpose of protecting "the
accused from having to defend himself against charges of remote
misconduct," 156 and that it is not a constitutional or fundamental right.
Second, the legislature amended the statute of limitations for felonies
subsequent to Dabney's indictment and established the DNA-based John
157
Doe warrant as a valid prosecutorial tool under certain circumstances.

151.

See United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a

general description in the warrant of the items to be searched may be acceptable "if a more precise
description is not possible"); see also United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)

(stating that one relevant factor in appraising the specificity of warrants is whether the government
could have described the items more particularly "in light of the information available to it at the
time the warrant was issued"); United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v.
152.
153.
154.

Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1982).
See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 372.
Id.

155. Id. at 373.
156. Id. (quotation omitted).
157. See id. WIS. STAT. § 939.74(2d) states in pertinent part:
"deoxyribonucleic acid profile" means an individual's patterned chemical structure of
genetic information identified by analyzing biological material that contains the
individual's deoxyribonucleic acid ["DNA"].
(b) If before the time limitation under sub. (1) expired [the six year period for felonies],
the state collected biological material that is evidence of the identity of the person who
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While the modified statute does not apply to Dabney, it is evidence of
the legislature's original intent for the statute of limitations in cases of
sexual assault. In effect, the legislature extended the period instead of
abolishing the statute of limitations altogether.
As discussed in Section II, there are four principal policies
supporting the establishment of statutes of limitation: the promotion of
repose for the defendant and all others involved, affording the defendant
protection against the possible disadvantages accompanying the defense
against stale claims, the recognition that as time passes, society's need
for punishment diminishes, and the interest in assuring diligence on the
State's part to prevent any attempts to delay the prosecution. In light of
these policies, is the Dabney decision reconcilable with the principles
supporting a statute of limitations?
Dabney's argument that the use of such a procedure could result in
the endless tolling of the statute of limitations was not accepted by the
court. Rather, the court found that the warrant does not effectively
eliminate the statute because the prosecution was commenced before the
expiration of the six year period. 158 Further, since the "legislature has
determined that six years is not so 'remote' as to negatively prejudice the
defendant's rights[J" the filing of the John Doe warrant did not violate
Dabney's rights. 159 The court did not directly address Dabney's
concerns, but rather argued the purpose of the statute of limitations and
the sufficiency with which this statute governed this situation. Dabney
did not contend that the warrant was not filed within the six year period,
nor did he argue that the legislatively determined six year period was so
remote as to hinder his defense. Rather, he argued that the filing of the
John Doe warrant allowed the statutory period, in essence, to continue
endlessly as the prosecution searched for the name to associate with the
known DNA code. 160 Therefore, the time of prosecution became
increasingly remote from the commission of the crime,
and Dabney's
61
ability to garner a defense was effectively diminished.'
committed a violation ... the state identified a [DNA] profile from the biological
material, and comparisons of that [DNA] profile to [DNA] profiles of known persons did
not result in a probable identification of the person who is the source of the biological
material, the state may commence prosecution of the person who is the source of the
biological material for violation ... within 12 months after comparison of the [DNA]
profile relating to the violation results in a probable identification of the person.
WIS. STAT. § 939.74(2d).
158. See Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 373.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 372.
161. See id. at 372. See also supra notes 99 - 102 and accompanying text (discussing the
complications to the defense caused by a delay in prosecution).
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The judicial conclusion was dictated by the statute's language. The
Wisconsin statute of limitations for a felony does not specify that the
trial must begin within the six year period, but rather that the prosecution
must be commenced, 62 and further defines "commenced" as being when
"a warrant or summons is issued, an indictment is found, or an
information is filed."' 163 The Dabney court had already determined that
the warrant was sufficient, and that it validly commenced the action. The
court further established its decision as concordant with the legislative
intent by pointing to the amendment made subsequent to Dabney's
indictment: 2001 Act 16 of the Wisconsin State legislature amended
subsections (1) and (2)(c) and created subsection (2d), expressly
addressing the issue of DNA profiles. 64 The court concluded that the
statute
demonstrates the legislature's recognition that DNA profiles do
sufficiently identify sexual-assault offenders and that the competing
interest in sexual-assault prosecutions weigh in favor of allowing such
prosecutions to commence after six years when the state has obtained
the offender's DNA profile but has been unable to match it to a known
DNA profile within that period. 165
Therefore, the acceptance of the John Doe warrant does not toll the
statute inevitably, but rather tolls it "under certain circumstances until a
match is discovered.' 66 The legislative intent to limit only the timing of
the commencement of the prosecution was clear in the language of the
statute of limitations even prior to the amendment. The amendment
effectually narrowed the statutory requirements in the particular situation
raised in Dabney to preempt future contentions on the issue.
Dabney's third, and final, claim was that his constitutionally
mandated due process rights were twice violated. First, "he was not
given sufficient notice of the claim because the original complaint and
warrant identified him only by his DNA."' 167 However, as the court
noted, a criminal "defendant is not entitled to specific notice that the
state is issuing a complaint and seeking an arrest warrant."' 168 The
defendant is not actually involved in the issuing process, and is not
notified of the pending criminal charge until the actual warrant is
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

WIS. STAT. § 939.74(1).
Id.
See id.
Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 373.
Id.
Id. at 374.
Id.
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issued. 169 When the actual warrant for Dabney was issued, "John Doe"
had already been replaced with his real name.' 70 Therefore, it did not
matter whether or not Dabney could identify his own DNA code,
because it never appeared on the final warrant.
Second, Dabney argued that his Due Process rights were violated
by the delay in prosecution. He contended that "the State intentionally
delayed this case until it was able to obtain a positive DNA
identification... [and] that, as a result... [he] has been prejudiced
because 'memories fade' and 'witnesses become unavailable." ' ' 7 The
court's rejection of this argument rests upon State v. Wilson, 172 which
states that for a claim to be dismissed upon a violation of Due Process, a
defendant must "prove that the Government's delay in bringing the
indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and
that it caused him actual prejudice in presenting his defense."' 73 This
decision is substantially based upon a series of Supreme Court decisions,
which establish that four factors should be considered when determining
whether a defendant's Due Process right of a speedy trial has been
violated: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and the resulting prejudice caused to the
defendant. 74 "To prosecute a defendant following investigative delay
does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been
somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time."' 175 Instead, one must show
that the delay was either a malicious tactic employed by the prosecution
in an attempt to hinder the defendant, or was the result of a reckless
disregard for timeliness on the part of the prosecution.
The court held that Dabney failed to satisfy his burden by not
sufficiently presenting a claim of actual prejudice, and by not
establishing that the "delay in filing the complaint resulted from an
improper prosecutorial motive or purpose."' 176 Instead of proving actual
prejudice, Dabney relied upon the argument that since the statute of
limitations had expired, prejudice was "irrebuttably presumed,"'' 77 but

169. See id.
170.
171.

172.
173.
174.
467 U.S.
407 U.S.
175.
176.
177.

See id.
Id.

440 N.W.2d 534 (Wis. 1989).
Id.
at 544.
See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992); United States v. Gouveia,
180, 192 (1984); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977); Barker v. Wingo,
514, 522 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-2541971).
Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796.
Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 374.
Id.
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failed to provide any specific allegations of prejudice. 178 He further
failed to show with particularity any advantage gained by the
prosecution through the delay, and was therefore unable to support an
allegation of improper motive or purpose. 179
81
1 80
The aforementioned Supreme Court cases, Gouveia, Lovasco*
Barker,'82 Doggett183 and Marion,184 caution that each of the four prongs
of the Court's approach to addressing a delay in prosecution are neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition to the finding of deprivation of the
right: "Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together
with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors
have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and
sensitive balancing process."' 85 Included in each of these Supreme Court
cases is a reminder that because the right to a speedy trial is
fundamental, the "process must be carried out with full recognition that
the accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the
Constitution."1 86 The primary concerns of the Speedy Trial Clause are
identified as being the protection against "undue and oppressive
incarceration" and the "anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation,"' 87 and that the passage of time will cause the defendant to
suffer prejudice to his ability to defend himself.188 Of these concerns, the
last is recognized as being the most important because "the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system,"1 89 calling into question the propriety of the entire justice
system.
Barker made it clear that "different weights should be assigned to
different reasons" for delay. 90 The Doggett court distinguished between
negligence on the part of the prosecution and deliberate intent to hinder
178. Id. During trial, the substance of the prosecution's case was founded on the DNA sample
left in the victim's mouth and the statement of the victim. Dabney presented no rebutting evidence,
leading the court to the conclusion that his case was not adversely affected by the delay.
179. Id. Instead, Dabney relied upon a claim that the DNA profile could have been run earlier,
resulting in an earlier identification. However, the facts indicated that the test was run against the
national database before the final discovery, but returned no match at that time.
180. 467 U.S. 180 (1984).
181. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
182. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
183. 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
184. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
185. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
186. Id.
187. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320.
188. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 660.
189. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
190. Id. at 531.
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the defense, assigning a lighter weight to the former during the court's
balancing, but made clear that either reason for delay "falls on the wrong
side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons f6r
delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun."' 9 1 The Court further
reasoned that "[c]ondoning prolonged and unjustifiable delays in
prosecution would both penalize many defendants for the state's fault
and simply encourage the government to gamble with the interests of
criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority."' 92 However, it is
recognized that delay is inevitable, and more likely than not will cause
some complications for the defense. What must be shown is that "the
interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing
ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay. ' 193 If the accused
makes this showing, "the court must then consider, as one factor among
several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare
minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim."1 94 A
defendant cannot claim that his right to a speedy trial has' 95been violated if
the prosecution has acted with "customary promptness."'
What must then be considered in determining whether Dabney
presents a constitutional violation are the circumstances of the
prosecutorial delay. As was previously mentioned, Dabney alleged that
the DNA profile on the sample collected from the victim could have
96
been run earlier, therefore resulting in an earlier identification.
However, when the profile was created, there was no known match to
identify the perpetrator.1 97 When the profile was run against the national
198
DNA databank on December 18, 2000, there was still no match found.
However, on February 27, 2001, the DNA profile was again run against
the databank, and Robert Dabney was identified as the perpetrator. 199
This match was reconfirmed on March 7, 2001.200 The court found "no
evidence that the State intentionally delayed the prosecution of [the] case
in order to obtain a tactical advantage over Dabney." 20 1 The burden was
on Dabney to establish the improper prosecutorial motive or purpose.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657.
Id.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31.
See id. at 533-34.
See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652.
Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 374.
Seeid at 369.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid at 375.
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However, his contention failed because he did not show that the
prosecution acted with anything other than customary promptness when
periodically checking the profile against the databank. The Dabney court
adopted the Supreme Court factors to determine the inappropriateness of
the delay, and acted in accordance with precedent. There is every reason
to believe the Supreme Court would decide the issue in the same fashion,
holding that DNA-based John Doe warrants are constitutional.
CONCLUSION

So why amend the statute of limitations to allow the utilization of
the John Doe warrant? As discussed, there is no federal court holding on
the issue; the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin is the highest court to yet
address the issue. If the DNA-based John Doe warrant is going to be a
reliable and feasible tool for the states, there' needs to be greater
assurance for the prosecution than the likelihood that it could hold up in
court. Many state courts have not yet uttered the words "DNA-based
John Doe warrant," and the initial debate of the issue would become a
long and unneeded process as it is argued in each state. The focus of
each of these cases would be diverted from the central issue of each, the
sexual assault that occurred, to the tangential issue of whether the
identification of the perpetrator was enough to satisfy the particularity
requirement, the jurisdictional issue, the statute of limitations, and the
issue of the due process right to a speedy trial. An amendment or
abolition of the statutes of limitation relevant to sexual assault cases
would prevent the superfluous litigation that would likely result, and
would lead to the swift justice society seeks.
As discussed, there will soon be at least thirty states, including New
York, 2 that have passed legislation removing or extending the statutes
of limitation on sexual offenses in which DNA evidence is found at the
crime scene.20 3 The fears raised by civil libertarians, who contend that
use of the warrants abridges the defendant's right to a fair trial, can best
be addressed by statutorily determining the procedure that is to be
followed when issuing a John Doe warrant. As evidenced by
Wisconsin's recently amended statute, the defendants' interest in
202. See Moran, supra note 19. A campaign in New York City, the John Doe Indictment
Project, seeks to do DNA testing for hundreds of unsolved sex-crimes before the end of the 10-year
statute of limitations.
203. For a sample of such legislation see National Conference of State Legislatures, State
Legislation on Statute of Limitationsfor Certain Sex Offenses and Identifying Perpetratorsby DNA

Profiles (January 2003), at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/
visited May 19, 2005).
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maintaining a viable defense can be preserved while still allowing the
prosecution to go forward with the case.
The harm caused to society by the horrors of sexual assault is
indubitable. Without further amendment to current statutes of limitation,
states' efforts to effectuate justice will continue to be thwarted by the
law's failure to keep pace with technological advances. Since 2000,
Manhattan prosecutors have had to close over 690 sexual assault cases,
despite solid leads on, and occasional identification of, the perpetrators
through DNA evidence, because of the expiration of the statutes of
limitation. 0 4 The evidence further showed that a portion of these crimes
were committed by repeat offenders. °5 However, the dangers to society
caused by these lapses in justice may be avoided. The advent of DNA
identification, its use in warrants, and the ingenuity of state legislatures
such as Wisconsin's have together antiquated the arguments supporting
the perpetuation of statutes of limitation in rape cases where DNA
evidence is present. The DNA-based John Doe warrant does not propose
the truncation of a defendant's rights where proper procedure is
followed; rather, it promises the preservation of valid and substantial
evidence that furthers the pursuit of justice. Society would best be served
by the nationwide acceptance of a statutorily enacted John Doe warrant.
Corey E. Delaney*

204. See Preston, supra note 70.
205. See id.
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